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Extradition-A Comparison Of Louisiana
Law And The Uniform Act
Dale E. Bennett*
Interstate extradition of those charged with crime in one
state and found in another state is provided for by the Federal
Constitution and statutory authority. Implementing state legis-
lation has been universally adopted. Since extradition involves
the cooperation of two states, the state extraditing and the state
of asylum, it is particularly important to have uniform state pro-
cedures. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,' embracing
what were considered the best features of the various state laws,
was approved by the National Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1926. Subsequent amendments were adopted in 1936.
The Interstate Commission on Crime approved the uniform
extradition act in 1936 and is cooperating with the Commission-
ers of Uniform Acts in recommending its adoption by the several
states. The Uniform Act has now been adopted by forty-one of
the fifty states, including Louisiana's neighboring states of Ala-
bama, 2 Arkansas," and Texas. 4 A comparison of Louisiana's ex-
tradition law and the Uniform Act is important as pointing the
way to possible improvement of Louisiana's law and bringing it
more in line with the procedures of the forty-one adopting states.
It is also of immediate practical significance, since when Louisi-
ana authorities are seeking to extradite a fugitive from a state
with the Uniform Act the procedures of the state of asylum (the
Uniform Act requirements) must be complied with.
A major difference between the Louisiana and Uniform
extradition laws relates to the question as to whether it shall be
the duty of the Governor to extradite a fugitive, or whether
arrest and delivery of the fugitive shall be discretionary with
the Governor. Under Article 160 of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure extradition of the accused is discretionary.
Section 2 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act imposes a
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 9 U.L.A. 263 (1957).
2. Adopted in 1931, 15 ALA. CODE §§ 48-74 (1940).
3. Adopted in 1935, Ark. Stats. §§ 43-3001--3028.
4. Adopted in 1951, TEx. ANN. CODE CarM. PROC. art. 1008a, §§ 1-30 (Vernon,
1950).
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duty on the Governor to extradite when the conditions of the
act are met. Forty of the forty-one states adopting the Uniform
Act retain the mandatory duty. The provision of the Uniform
Act in this regard is in accord with the spirit and purpose of
Article IV, Section 2, clause 2, of the United States Constitu-
tion, and of the federal enabling statute.5 Those provisions de-
clare that it shall be the duty of the state to extradite fugitives
from justice. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in
favor of retaining Louisiana's present rule under which extradi-
tion is discretionary with the Governor, who may deny extradi-
tion in the exceptional case where the wanted criminal has ef-
fected a complete self-rehabilitation and has established himself
as a worthwhile member of the community. Also it can be argued
that the Governor should be able to deny extradition where it
is sought as a step in high-pressure bill collecting. It was upon
these grounds that the Louisiana Legislature has, on at least
two occasions, turned down bills which would have adopted the
Uniform Extradition Act. The question has been raised as to
the constitutionality of providing that extradition shall be at
the discretion of the Governor, when both the United States con-
stitutional provision and the federal statute which implements it
make it the Governor's duty to extradite. It was answered in
Kentucky v. Dennison6 where the United States Supreme Court
held that the federal government has no constitutional authority
to compel a state to exercise the duty imposed by the Constitu-
tion. The court recognized the existence of a duty, but stated
that its enforcement depended on the fidelity of state governors.
Louisiana's discretionary extradition, as provided for in Article
160, has not been seriously challenged.
The scope of extradition under the Uniform Act is broader
than under Louisiana's Article 160 which applies only to a per-
son who is sought "as a fugitive from justice." The Uniform Act
applies to any person charged in the demanding state and
found in another state. Section 5 of the Uniform Act authorizes
extradition of a criminal who left the demanding state under
compulsion, as where he had been extradited to the state of
present asylum for trial. Section 6 of the Uniform Act covers
the situation of an offender who was not present in the demand-
ing state when the crime was committed, as where a shot was
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1948).
6. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
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fired across a state line or the offender performed his part of
a crime from outside the state. In these situations the offender
would not be a "fugitive from justice," for he has not fled from
the demanding state after the commission of his crime.7
Extradition of the escaped prisoner or parole-jumper is more
clearly provided for in the Uniform Act than in the Louisiana
statute for extradition. Section 3 of the Uniform Act specifically
states that the demand may be accompanied by "a copy of a
judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution
thereof, together with a statement by the Executive Authority
(Governor) of the demanding state that the person claimed has
escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail,
probation or parole." While the escapee qualifies for extradition
as a "fugitive from justice," Louisiana's Article 160 does not
designate the papers which are to accompany the demand for his
return. To authorize extradition of an escaped convict or parole
violator from Louisiana it will probably be necessary to meet
the stated general requirement by furnishing a certified copy
of a sworn statement of facts by the prosecuting attorney and
of the indictment or information which was the basis of the
original arrest and conviction." It will also be necessary to fur-
nish documents showing the fugitive's conviction, sentence, and
escape. Since these are not specified in Louisiana's extradition
law, Louisiana practice might logically follow the Uniform Act
requirements very closely. A special situation is presented where
a parolee is in this state under the interstate compact for parole
supervision. This compact expressly provides that officials of
the sending state may enter and retake the parolee without
extradition proceedings.9
It is implicit in both the Louisiana and Uniform extradition
laws that the request for extradition shall be made by the Gov-
ernor of the demanding state. The official papers which accom-
pany the demand must meet the requirements of the law of the
state of asylum, and the prisoner is entitled to be released if
the papers do not fully satisfy the law.10 When the authorities
of another state are seeking to extradite a fugitive from Lou-
isiana, Article 160 requires a certified copy of "a sworn state-
7. State v. Hall, 20 S.E. 729 (N.C. 1894).
8. LA. R.S. 15:160 (1950).
9. Id. 15:574.14(3).
10. State ex rel. Covington v. Hughes, Sheriff, 157 La. 652, 102 So. 824
(1925).
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ment of facts by the prosecuting attorney and of the indictment,
information or affidavit pending" in the demanding state. The
statement of facts by the prosecuting officer assures the Gov-
ernor of information Which will assist him in determining the
propriety of the extradition. A certified copy of the indictment
or information shows that the person wanted has been formally
charged with a crime in the demanding state, while the affidavit
will go to show that a proper basis for a formal charge exists.
Section 3 of the Uniform Act, similarly aimed at establishing
the official status of the charge in the demanding state, requires
that the Governor's requisition be "accompanied by a copy of
an indictment found or by an information supported by affi-
davit .... or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate
there, together with any warrant which was issued there-
upon ...."
Louisiana's Article 160 includes an "information" as a proper
basis for an extradition demand. Section 3 of the Uniform Act
specifies an "information supported by affidavit." (Emphasis
added.) The Federal Extradition Statute, drafted at a time
when all major charges were made by grand jury indictment,
does not mention the information. This gives rise to a question
as to whether extradition is being authorized on something less
than is required by the federal law. A commentator in American
Jurisprudence states that, "While it has been declared that state
laws cannot make any requirements further than those made by
the Act of Congress, yet the laws of a state may require the
governor to surrender a fugitive on terms less exacting than
those imposed by the Act of Congress, and also that the state
may provide for cases not provided for by the United States."
(Emphasis added.)" This statement is weakened by the fact
that no authority directly in point is cited for the proposition
that terms less exacting may be required. To the contrary, the
United States Supreme Court has entertained suits to test the
legality of extradition proceedings wherein the accused con-
tended that his extradition was unauthorized because the re-
quirements of the Federal Constitution and enabling statute
had not been met. In In The Matter of Strauss,'2 the Supreme
Court heard and disallowed a contention by the accused that his
extradition was not "authorized" because he was not "charged"
11. 22 AM. Jun. 250 (1939).
12. 197 U.S. 324 (1905).
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within the meaning of Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2, of the
United States Constitution. In Hogan v. O'Neill13 the accused
unsuccessfully complained that the indictment did not charge
him with the commission of a crime. The court then determined
that there was "adequate ground for his return as a fugitive
from justice" under the federal statutes. These two decisions by
no means exhaust the jurisprudence on the point, but they are
illustrative of the fact that the Supreme Court has entertained
appeals wherein it was complained that something less than the
federal requirement had been met. By a consideration of the
accused's complaint, these cases indicate that the federal en-
abling statute sets up minimum as well as maximum require-
ments. To the same effect, but more closely in point as to the
sufficiency of an "information," is the early case of Ex parte
Hart,14 where the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit, on appeal from one detained to await extradition, held
that an "information" was not equivalent to an indictment or
affidavit and would not "authorize" extradition proceedings.
The accused was ordered released from custody. Thus the Fourth
Circuit has squarely held that the federal statute prescribes a
minimum requirement beyond which the state may not extradite.
If it is assumed, and this issue is far from clear, that state
extradition laws must conform to the minimum requirements
of the federal enabling statute, a further question is presented.
Is an "information" equivalent to an indictment or affidavit
as a basis for extraditing? In conflict with the holding of the
Fourth Circuit in Ex parte Hart is a statement by the Supreme
Court in the case of Matter of Strauss. As against the conten-
tion that the word "charged" employed in Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 2, of the United States Constitution means a formal docu-
ment which may be made the basis of trial, the Supreme Court
held that the "affidavit" required by the federal enabling statute
contemplates any sworn statement made before a magistrate
and need not be adequate to support a trial. In construing the
meaning of the word "charged," the court made the following
observation, "Why should the state be put to the expense of a
grand jury and an indictment before securing possession of the
party to be tried? It may be, as counsel urge, that persons are
sometimes wrongfully extradited, particularly in cases like the
13. 255 U.S. 52 (1921).
14. 6.3 Fed. 249 (4th Cir. 1894).
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present; that a creditor may want only to swear to an affidavit
charging a debtor with obtaining goods under false pretenses.
But it is also true that a prosecuting officer may either wantonly
or ignorantly file an information charging a like offense. But
who would doubt that an information, when that is the statutory
pleading for purposes of trial, is sufficient to justify an extra-
dition?' 5 It is inherent in the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in the Strauss case that the federal requirements are
met by any form of charge which may be authorized by law in
the demanding state. The term indictment may very logically
be interpreted, in its generic sense, as describing any mode of
formal accusation. The fact that the extradition may be based
upon an affidavit shows that the charge need not be based upon
a grand jury's investigation. The state court decisions are at
variance as to whether the information alone is equivalent to an
indictment,' or whether a supporting affidavit is necessary to
render it a proper charge for extradition purposes. 17 It is sub-
mitted that a supporting affidavit adds very little to the infor-
mation, which is already a very strong document.
An "affidavit" is included as an alternate means of showing
that the person demanded is wanted for a crime. Under both
Louisiana's Article 160 and the federal extradition statute 8 the
affidavit has the same authoritative effect as an indictment or
information. Section 3 of the Uniform Act requires that the
copy of an affidavit must be accompanied by "a copy of any
warrant issued thereupon." The affidavit contemplated by the
federal enabling act is probably an accusation which will be a
sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, rather
than as the basis for a trial. In defining the word "charged,"
as used in the federal statute, the United States Supreme Court
declared in Matter of Strauss that, "In the strictest sense of the
term a party is charged with a crime when an affidavit is filed,
alleging the commission of the offense and a warrant is issued
for his arrest, and this is true whether a final trial may or may
not be had upon such charge. It may be, and is true, that in
many of the states some further proceeding is, in the higher
grade of offenses at least, necessary before the party can be
15. 197 U.S. 324, 332 (1905).
16. Stark v. Livermore, 3 N.J. 94, 65 A.2d 625 (1949); Hollander v. Britt,
92 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1949), aff'd, 93 N.Y.S.2d 704, 276 App. Div. 815 (1949).
17. Lipshitz v. Bessenger, 75 N.Y.S.2d 392, 273 App. Div. 19 (1947).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1948).
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put upon trial, and that the proceedings before an examining
magistrate are preliminary, and only with a view to the arrest
and detention of the alleged criminal; but extradition is a mere
proceeding in securing arrest and detention." 19 The word "af-
fidavit" may be employed in Louisiana's Article 160 to mean
an official charge that will serve as the basis for the final trial
of petty offenses. This limited meaning is indicated by the dis-
charge provisions of Article 167, which provides for the
prisoner's release if the indictment, information or affidavit
accompanying the Governor's requisition "is fatally defective
as a criminal charge" under the law of the demanding state.
When the Governor is satisfied that the extradition papers
are in order he may issue a warrant for the arrest of the wanted
criminal. This warrant may be recalled at any time "for cause
by him (the Governor) deemed sufficient. '" The warrant is
directed to "any peace officer of the parish in which such fugi-
tive may then be,"'21 and orders the officer to deliver the fugitive
to the representative of the demanding state who is "designated
in the warrant. '22 Louisiana's general arrest law, authorizing
a person to summon assistance in making a lawful arrest,- is
broad enough to apply to the officer who is executing the Gov-
ernor's warrant of arrest issued in aid of extradition. Section 9
of the Uniform Extradition law specifically provides that the
officer entrusted with execution of the Governor's warrant shall
have authority to command assistance in making the arrest.
Louisiana's Article 160 does not specify the recitals of the
Louisiana Governor's warrant. Section 7 of the Uniform Act
states that the Governor's warrant "must substantially recite
the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance," thus raising
a problem as to the effectiveness of a warrant whose recitals
were insufficient. In a Colorado case 24 the court took the view
that a warrant which failed to recite these facts was "wholly
ineffectual for any purpose," and dismissed the accused. In con-
sidering a similar problem on habeas corpus proceedings, the
19. 197 U.S. 324, 331 (1905).
20. LA. R.S. 15:161 (1950). Accord: Uniform Criminal Extradition Act § 21.
21. LA. R.S. 15:160 (1950). Cf. under Section 7 of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, the warrant may be directed to "any peace officer."
22. LA. R.S. 15:160 (1950) ; Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 8, provides
for delivery to "the hly authorized agenit of the demanding state."
23. LA. R.S. 15:65 (1950).
24. Stobie v. Barger, 268 P.2d 409 (Colo. 1954).
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Supreme Court of Alabama held 25 that a warrant which failed
to recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance would
not render the accused illegally held if the warrant was actually
based on a sufficient requisition demand by the Governor of
the demanding state. The approach taken by the Alabama court
is sound. The recital of facts in the warrant should be treated
as directory in nature, rather than as mandatory for the validity
of the warrant of arrest. The validity of the warrant is depend-
ent upon the existence of a sufficient and valid requisition de-
mand, rather than the completeness of its recitals. Possibly the
best solution is to specify the nature of the recitals, but to add
that an incomplete statement of facts should not invalidate the
warrant if a proper basis for its issuance existed.
The rights of a person arrested, pursuant to the Governor's
warrant, to an extradition hearing are fully spelled out in the
Louisiana law. Article 164 states that he shall be taken before
a committing magistrate (usually a district judge, although a
city judge could hold such a hearing) who will inform the
prisoner of the charge against him in the demanding state, and
will inquire as to his willingness to return to that state for trial.
If the prisoner replies that he consents to return for trial, Article
165 provides for his immediate delivery into the custody of the
agent of the demanding state. Corresponding Section 25A of
the Uniform Act requires that a written waiver be executed
before the judge, thus providing a desirable record of the will-
ingness of the prisoner to return to the demanding state to stand
trial.
A hearing to test the validity of the extradition must be
promptly held when the accused does not consent to return to
the demanding state. The Louisiana hearing procedure, set out
in Articles 166 and 167, is much simpler than the comparable
Uniform Act provisions. Section 10 of the Uniform Act requires
an additional step, i.e., an application by the accused for a writ
of habeas corpus. The issues at the Louisiana extradition hear-
ing are set out in Article 167. The Uniform Act does not state
these issues, apparently assuming that the grounds for object-
ing to the extradition may be adequately gleaned from other
provisions of the act.26 Under Louisiana's Article 167 the papers
accompanying the requisition must be in order. The copy of the
25. Harris v. State, 257 Ala. 3, 60 So.2d 266 (1952).
26. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, §§ 3, 7, 23.
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indictment or information must be certified by the Governor of
the demanding state, 27 and must also constitute a valid criminal
charge under the laws of that state. It is a further ground of
discharge that the requisition of the Governor of the demanding
state, or the Louisiana Governor's warrant of arrest issued
pursuant thereto, "is defective or improperly executed.' 28 The
prisoner is also entitled to be released if there has been a mistake
in identity, i.e., if he is not "the person mentioned in the war-
rant, requisition, and indictment, information or affidavit." An
alibi-type of ground for discharge is provided by the require-
ment that the prisoner must have been in the demanding state at
the time of the alleged offense unless the crime was one where
presence in the state was not essential to the crime. Outside of
the above-noted ground of discharge, which is sort of a combina-
tion of alibi and impossibility, the guilt or innocence of the
accused is not an issue at the extradition hearing. Unless one
of the specified grounds for discharge is established, the prisoner
is to be delivered to the agent of the demanding state.
It will often be necessary to provide temporary local confine-
ment for the prisoner who is being extradited and returned to
the demanding state, or for a prisoner who is being brought
through the state after extradition proceedings in another state.
The Uniform Act provides fully for this situation--stating the
duty to provide local confinement, the continuing authority of
the officer in charge, and his responsibility for the expenses of
keeping the prisoner..2 9 Louisiana's extradition law does not
cover these matters, with local assistance being dependent upon
the voluntary cooperation of local jail officials. The original
Uniform Extradition Act of 1926 did not contain the provision
for local confinement of a prisoner who is being taken through
the local state after extradition in a third state for return to the
state of his crime. This provision safeguards against the misuse
of state facilities by providing that the officer in charge of the
prisoner must produce "satisfactory written evidence" of the
fact that the prisoner being transported through the state has
been officially extradited. Local recognition of the foreign extra-
dition procedure is afforded by the express provision that, "Such
27. State ex rel. Covington v. Hughes, 157 Ta. 652, 102 So. 824 (1925).
Accord: Section 3 of the Uniform Act also requires authentication of the sup-
porting indictment.
28. Accord : Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 7, provides that the Gov-
ernor "shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the state seal."
29. Id. § 12.
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prisoner shall not be entitled to demand a new requisition while
in this state."
The arrest and temporary detention of a fugitive pending the
arrival of formal extradition papers is fully provided for in both
the Louisiana law3° and the Uniform Act. 1 Under Article 168
of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure a warrant for the
temporary detention of the fugitive is to be issued "when any
person shall be charged on the oath of any credible person, be-
fore any committing magistrate, with being a fugitive from
the justice of any other state. . . ." The person arrested is en-
titled to a hearing in open court, and is to be committed to await
extradition only if the judge is "of the opinion that the accused
is a fugitive from justice."3 2 This right to a hearing in open
court serves as a protection against improper and unfounded
detention. If the accused is not afforded this examination, he
may obtain relief by promptly applying for a writ of habeas
corpus to test the legality of his detention. However, if a regular
requisition for his surrender is subsequently made, the fact that
his prior detention was illegal shall not preclude his extradition
to the demanding state.38 Louisiana's Article 168 and the com-
parable Uniform Act provision3 4 are identical in limiting the
period of temporary detention to thirty days. In In re Corn-
misso-3 5 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that where the ac-
cused had already been imprisoned for thirty days under insuf-
ficient extradition papers, the temporary detention provision
could not be employed as a means of holding him for an addi-
tional period of time. This decision made it abundantly clear
that, regardless of the filing of successive affidavits, the accused
cannot be held awaiting proper extradition papers for a period
longer than thirty days. The constitutionality of temporary de-
tention provisions, though none is found in the federal extradi-
tion law,36 was settled by the United States Supreme Court in
Burton v. New York Cent. R.R.,37 where Justice Brandeis made
the following statement: "These provisions of the constitutions
30. LA. R.S. 15:168 (1950).
31. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 13.
32. In re Mitchell, 205 N.C. 788, 172 S.E. 350 (1934).
33. Ex parte King, 139 Me. 203, 28 A.2d 562 (1,942) (absence of examina-
tion) ; La Sasso v. McLeod, 137 N.J.L. 45, 56 A.2d 430 (1948) (illegal arrest).
34. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 15.
35. 214 La. 1055, 39 So.2d 729 (1949).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1948).
37. 245 U.S. 315, 318 (1917).
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and federal statutes (relating to interstate rendition) do not
deal with arrest in advance of a requisition. They do not limit
the power of a state to arrest, within its borders a citizen of
another state for a crime committed elsewhere; nor do they pre-
scribe the manner in which such arrest be made. They are mat-
ters left wholly to the individual states. Whether the asylum
state shall make an arrest in advance of requisition, and if so,
whether it may be made without a warrant, are matters which
each state decides for itself. Such has been the uniform practice,
sanctioned by a long line of decisions and regulated by legisla-
tion in many of the states." The Uniform Act goes even further
than Louisiana's Article 168 and permits arrest without a war-
rant "upon reasonable information" that the accused stands
charged with a major crime.38 The constitutionality of this ar-
rest procedure was affirmed in Commonwealth ex rel. Huey v.
Dye,39 where the Pennsylvania Court stressed the fact that the
arrest provision required that the person arrested be taken be-
fore a magistrate where his answer would be heard, just as if he
had been arrested on a warrant.4 °
Release on bail is particularly hazardous in extradition situa-
tions. The accused has already fled from the state of his crime
and the probabilities of his jumping bail are much greater than
in the arrest of a local criminal for trial. The bail provisions
of the Uniform Act 41 are limited to arrests for temporary de-
tention to await a requisition for extradition, and further pro-
vide that the prisoner "may" be admitted to bail. Louisiana's
Article 169 provides generally that the fugitive "shall be en-
titled to be discharged on bail until there is a judgment declaring
him a fugitive from the justice of such state or territory." Lou-
isiana's broad bail provision may have been dictated by a belief
that our constitutional right to bai 4 2 applies to those held pend-
38. Uniform, Criminal Extradition Act, § 14, limiting such arrests to cases
where the accused is charged "with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year." In Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240
(3d Cir. 1945), arrest of a fugitive from justice, not charged with a crime for
which he might be imprisoned for more than a year, on a "detainer" telegram was
held to constitute a violation of this section.
39. 373 Pa. 508, 96 A.2d 129 (1953).
40. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 14, provides that the person arrested
must be taken before a judge "with all practicable speed."
41. Id. §§ 15, 16.
42. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 12, which reads in part: "All persons shall be bailable
by sufficient sureties, except the following: 1. Persons charged with a capital of-
fense, where the proof is evident or the presumption great. Persons convicted of
felonies ... (unless sentence of less than five years is imposed)."
[Vol. XX
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ing extradition proceedings. This view, however, is not sup-
ported by the sparse decisions in point. In Waller v. Jordan43
the Arizona Supreme Court declared that, "It should be re-
membered that this provision [a provision like Louisiana's Ar-
ticle I, Section 12] and all others of our constitution relating
to criminal proceedings have application only to those crimes
over which the state authorities have jurisdiction by virtue of
their having been committed in the state." (Emphasis added.) In
further support of the view that the constitutional right to bail
applies only to those held for criminal prosecution in the state is
Meltzer v. United States"4 holding that until a defendant is in
the court of the indictment, the right to bail does not apply.
Louisiana's broad bail authorization will not, however, result in
wholesale releases of those arrested for extradition purposes.
The court will consider the fact that the prisoner is a fugitive
from justice in fixing the amount of the bail.
Where the wanted criminal is already imprisoned and await-
ing trial for a Louisiana crime, the Louisiana Governor may
withhold extradition until the local prosecution is completed and
the sentence served.45 Where the crime in the demanding state
is a more serious one, the Governor may feel that prompt extra-
dition is appropriate. Pursuant to his authority to refuse extra-
dition, he may condition surrender of the accused upon the
Governor of the demanding state entering into a re-extradition
agreement. Such agreements are authorized and provided for
in Section 5 of the Uniform Act. Under this procedure the
original surrender of the prisoner to the demanding state is
pursuant to Louisiana's regular extradition proceedings and re-
quirements. The subsequent return of the prisoner to Louisiana
will be based entirely upon the agreement of the Governor of
the demanding state, and will not be subject to regular extra-
dition requirements and formalities.
A serious question has been raised by several decisions as to
a possible conflict between a statutory provision granting the
Governor power to extradite persons already under criminal
prosecution in the state, and state constitutional provisions call-
ing for a separation of powers between the legislative, execu-
43. 58 Ariz. 169, 173, 118 P.2d 450, 452 (1941).
44. 188 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1951).
45. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872); Commonwealth v.
Ashe, 141 Pa. Super. 119, 173 At]. 715 (1934), holding that U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, does not require immediate surrender of the accused.
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tive, and judicial branches of government. The issue is whether
executive surrender of a person presently under criminal prose-
cution in a state would transgress the powers of the judiciary.
In an early Massachusetts opinion, 46 the court stated that it
would violate the separation of powers requirement to allow the
Governor to extradite a person imprisoned in that state at the
time of attempted extradition. The court noted that it had been
decided that a person released on bail could be extradited on the
theory that the judiciary had given up custody of the accused.
This dictum distinction appears to have been recognized in a
number of other cases. 47  In Hobbs v. State48 the Texas court
held that the Governor had no power to arrest the jurisdiction
of the court by the issuance of a warrant for extradition where
the accused was held under criminal prosecution in the state of
Texas. The court, however, did not indicate whether this lack
of authority stemmed from the absence of statutory power or
from constitutional limitations. The later Texas case of Ex parte
McDanie149 recognized the Hobbs case as law, but did not elabo-
rate on the holding. In upholding a statute which provided that
the Governor could not extradite a person held under criminal
prosecution in the state the Oregon Supreme Court indicated by
way of dictum that the Governor lacked power to extradite in
such a situation. Such action, according to the opinion, would
constitute a violation of the separation of powers requirement of
the state constitution. 50 A 1947 Ohio Court of Common Pleas
decision held that the Governor had no authority to extradite a
person serving a five-year sentence on probation.51 In a rather
confusingly written opinion the court cited In re Opinion of
Justices, and seemed to indicate that the extradition of a person
under probation would be a violation of the separation of powers
requirement. The precise rationale of this decision is uncertain,
however. On the other hand, the power of the Governor to extra-
dite persons against whom local prosecutions are pending has
been recognized since the adoption of the Uniform Act by the
46. In re Opinion of Justices, 201 Mass. 609, 89 N.E. 174 (1909).
47. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872) ; Roberts v. Reilly, 116
U.S. 80 (1885) ; People v. Klinger, 319 Il1. 275, 149 N.E. 799 (1925) ; In re
Harris, 309 Mass. 180, 34 N.E.2d 504 (1941) ; Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Ore. 128,
171 Pac. 577 (1918).
48. 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 312, 22 S.W. 1035 (1893).
49. 76 Tex. Crim. Rep. 184, 173 S.W. 1018 (1915).
50. Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Ore. 128, 171 Pac. 577 (1918).
51. Ex parte Bell, 75 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio 1947).
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Illinois,52 New York,53 and Pennsylvania54 courts. These deci-
sions are somewhat weakened by the fact that there was no
discussion, in any of them, of the separation of powers require-
ment. In a New York case55 arising before the promulgation
of the Uniform Act, the court held that it was properly an execu-
tive function, to determine whether to surrender a person ac-
cused in New York but demanded by another state. Such an
extradition was held not to be a transgression of judicial au-
thority. Which line of jurisprudence the Louisiana Supreme
Court would follow on this question is, of course, conjectural.
Possibly the Governor could avoid any challenge of his surrender
of the wanted criminal as an interference with the judicial de-
partment of the state5 6 by securing the consent of the district
attorney if a prosecution is pending,57 or of the trial court after
conviction. In addition to assuring the validity of the extradi-
tion, such a procedure would appropriately recognize the interest
which the district attorney and the court have in compliance or
non-compliance with the demand for extradition.
The converse situation, where Louisiana is seeking to extra-
dite a fugitive who is presently held for trial in another state,
is rendered difficult by the fact that Louisiana's law does not
authorize the Governor to enter into re-extradition agreements;
and by the further fact that the person brought involuntarily
into this state to stand trial could not be extradited back since
he would not be a "fugitive from justice."
The duty of instigating extradition proceedings, for recov-
ery of a Louisiana criminal who has escaped into another state,
is on the district attorney of the parish desiring to prosecute.58
His application to the Louisiana Governor for an extradition
requisition should fully set out the name of the accused, the
crime charged against him, the circumstances of its commission,
and the probable whereabouts of the accused in the state of
asylum. While Louisiana's extradition law is silent as to the
contents of the district attorney's application, the above listed
information will be needed by the Governor in determining the
52. People v. Bradley, 383 I1. 437, 50 N.E.2d 517 (1943).
53. People v. Adam, 74 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1947) ; Seiler v. Warden of City Prison,
102 N.Y.S.2d 969, 199 Misc. 570 (1951).
54. Accobacco v. Burke, 162 Pa. Sup. 592, 60 A.2d 426 (1948).
55. People v. Hogan, 69 N.Y.S. 475. 34 Misc. 85 (1901).
56. LA. CONST. art. II, § 2, requiring a separation of departmental powers.
57. The district attorney is a judicial officer under LA. CONST. art. VII, § 58.
58. LA. R.S. 15:170 (1950). Accord: Uniform Extradition Act § 231.
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propriety of issuing the requested extradition requisition. In
order to insure adequate information and to promote uniformity
as to the contents of applications for extradition, Section 231 of
the Uniform Act specifies the information which must be fur-
nished when the application is made. It also requires a certifica-
tion that "the ends of justice require the arrest and return of
the accused to this state for trial and that the proceeding is not
instituted to enforce a private claim." In states having the Uni-
form Act, failure to include the specified information and cer-
tification may result in the Governor's refusal to act, but it will
not serve as a technical basis for invalidating an application or
the Governor's requisition pursuant thereto. This has been con-
sistently borne out by the jurisprudence. A federal court has
held that a Virginia requisition was not invalidated because of
a failure to state the specific date of the offense charged. 9 A
New Hampshire decision held that rendition of the accused was
not invalidated by the fact that the requisition papers did not
contain a personal description of the accused or other identifica-
tion than his name and the date and place of the crime.60 The
provision requiring a prosecutor's application to state the ap-
proximate time, place, and circumstances of the commission of
the crime was also liberally construed by the Michigan court.61
The Uniform Act also specifies the documents which, along
with verified copies of the application, must be filed in dupli-
cate.6 2 This permits local filing of one set of papers, and pro-
vides another set of documents to be authenticated by the Gov-
ernor and forwarded with his requisition to the state of asylum.
Despite the absence of statutory requirements in Louisiana, local
district attorneys should make sure that their application pro-
vides adequate information and is accompanied by the papers
which must be filed with the Louisiana Governor's requisition.
Those necessary papers are determined by the extradition law
of the state of asylum, which will be the Uniform Act in forty-
one out of fifty states.
Neither the Louisiana law nor the Uniform Act imposes a
duty on the Governor to make a demand for extradition in every
59. Stumpf v. Matthews, 195 F.2d 35, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 177 (1952).
60. Thomas v. O'Brien, 98 N.H. 111, 96 A.2d 120 (1953).
61. Eo parte Molisak, 291 Mich. 46, 288 N.W. 329 (1939).
62. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act § 23(111) : "The application shall be
verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate and shall be accompanied by
two certified copies of the indictment returned, or information and affidavit filed."
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case where an application is filed by the local district attorney.
Usually the Governor will issue a requisition, upon a proper
showing with proper accompanying papers; but the Governor
has discretion in determining the propriety of extradition pro-
ceedings. The existence of executive discretion in this matter
is desirable, for it allows the Governor to determine the merits
of extradition under the facts of the individual case. If, for
example, the accused has made a new and respectable life else-
where, and has thus demonstrated the extent of his rehabilita-
tion, extradition may not be desirable.
When the Louisiana Governor issues a requisition for the
return of a fugitive from justice, Article 171 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure states that he shall "appoint some suitable
person" to present the demands, to receive the fugitive if de-
livered by the state of asylum, and to convey him to the sheriff
of the parish where the offense was committed. Section 22 of
the Uniform Act similarly provides for the designation of an
agent to receive the demanded fugitive, but does not specifically
charge such agent with the duty of presenting the Governor's
requisition for extradition. This is a very minor difference,
since the agent appointed to receive the fugitive will normally
also be entrusted with the duty of presenting the Governor's
demand. Under Louisiana's extradition law the expense of re-
turning the prisoner "shall be paid by the parish in which the
offense is charged to have been committed. '6 3 This is a cost of
instituting the prosecution which may be logically placed upon
the parish of the crime. The Uniform Act, however, predicates
responsibility for these charges on the seriousness of the crime.
If the crime is one punishable in the state penitentiary, the state
must pay the extradition expenses; otherwise the parish is
charged with payment. This looks like a distinction without
much difference.
It is well and logically settled that the state has unlimited
criminal jurisdiction over a person who has been brought back
into the state pursuant to a requisition for his extradition. Once
the accused is returned to the state he is subject to trial for any
and all crimes he may have committed in this state. The requisi-
tion for extradition states the offense for which the return of
the accused is demanded, but does not limit the state's jurisdic-
63. LA. R.S. 15:171 (1950).
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tion upon his return. In Lasceltes v. Georgia,64 the United States
Supreme Court held that the person extradited has no privilege
or immunity to be exempt from trial for other crimes than the
one designated in the requisition, without first having an op-
portunity to return to the state from which he was extradited.
The Supreme Court pointed out that in a previous decision 65 a
Kentucky fugitive from justice, who had been kidnapped from
the state of asylum and returned to Kentucky, was held for
* trial on a criminal charge. Justice Jackson logically concluded
that if a kidnapped fugitive could be constitutionally tried in the
state of his crime, it would be quite illogical to deny full criminal
jurisdiction over a fugitive who has been returned through
extradition proceedings. The decision concludes with the very
practical statement that "it would be a useless and idle pro-
cedure to require the State having custody of the alleged criminal
to return him to the State by which he was surrendered up in
order to go through the formality of again demanding his extra-
dition for the new or additional offenses on which it desired to
prosecute him. . . . Our conclusion is that, upon a fugitive's
surrender to the State demanding his return in pursuance of
national law, he may be tried in the state to which he is returned
for any other offense than that specified in the requisition for
his rendition." The rule of the Lascelles case is codified in Sec-
tion 26 of the Uniform Act. Louisiana's extradition law does
not state this rule, but it is a logical and well-settled principle
that will undoubtedly be applied by the courts of this state.
Different policy considerations come into play when indi-
vidual plaintiffs may seek to have a defendant charged with
crime and brought into the state in order that they may serve
him with process in civil actions. In order to prevent such abuse
of extradition procedures, Section 25 of the Uniform Act grants
the person extradited an immunity from process in civil actions
"arising out of the same set of facts as the criminal proceed-
ings" for which he was extradited, until he has been convicted. 6
If acquitted, the accused must be given "reasonable opportunity"
to return to the state from which he is extradited. It has been
held, under this immunity from service provision, that a judg-
ment obtained through service of process on an individual before
64. 148 U.S. 537, 543 (1893).
65. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888).
66. Bubar v. Dizbar, 240 Minn. 26, 60 N.W.2d 77 (1954), holding that a plea
of guilty was equivalent to being "convicted" and that service might then be made.
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he had reasonable opportunity to leave the jurisdiction was
void. 7 Louisiana's law fails to provide protection against such
possible abuse of extradition procedures.
The Louisiana State Law Institute is presently engaged, pur-
suant to a special legislative mandate,6 in preparing a revision
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In revising the extradition
laws careful attention will of course be paid to the Uniform
Act - both in the interest of promoting uniformity with the
procedures of other states and also to secure the advantages of
its more complete coverage of certain matters. However, it would
not be advisable to adopt the Uniform Act lock, stock, and barrel.
There are some situations, such as the extradition hearing,
where the present Louisiana procedure is simpler and more
expeditious. Many sections of the Uniform Act, while stating
sound rules, are cumbersomely and confusingly stated. Then,
too, there are policy questions, such as the advisability of con-
tinuing Louisiana's present discretionary rendition by the Gov-
ernor, which must be carefully analyzed and determined by the
Council of the Law Institute.
67. Klaiber v. Frank, 9 N.J. 1, 86 A.2d 679 (1952).
Mi. La. Acts 1956, No. 87.
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